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Abstract
Malicious software, or malware, presents a continuously evolving challenge in
computer security. These embedded snippets of code in the form of malicious files
or hidden within legitimate files cause a major risk to systems with their ability
to run malicious command sequences. Malware authors even use polymorphism
to reorder these commands and create several malicious variations. However, if
executed in a secure environment, one can perform early malware detection on
emulated command sequences.
The models presented in this paper leverage this sequential data derived via emula-
tion in order to perform Neural Malware Detection. These models target the core
of the malicious operation by learning the presence and pattern of co-occurrence
of malicious event actions from within these sequences. Our models can cap-
ture entire event sequences and be trained directly using the known target labels.
These end-to-end learning models are powered by two commonly used structures -
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Networks and Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs). Previously proposed sequential malware classification models process no
more than 200 events. Attackers can evade detection by delaying any malicious
activity beyond the beginning of the file. We present specialized models that can
handle extremely long sequences while successfully performing malware detection
in an efficient way. We present an implementation of the Convoluted Partitioning
of Long Sequences approach in order to tackle this vulnerability and operate on
long sequences. We present our results on a large dataset consisting of 634,249 file
sequences, with extremely long file sequences.
1 Introduction
Malicious software, or malware, is a persistent and continuously growing problem in computer
security. Malware can cause severe issues for computer users. By embedding certain snippets of
code within benign software, it can successfully run malicious commands without being detected
by anti-virus software. This execution can be further modified by malware authors as they can use
polymorphism to reorder malicious commands within different files. While ensuring coverage of
commands relevant to malware, they can hide within large sets of legitimate commands and remain
undetected. Before the file is allowed to be run on the native operating system, the anti-malware
engine first analyzes it using lightweight emulation. This task of detecting malware within the
emulation, however is extremely difficult. With continuously increasing number of subtle variations
observed in malware, simply constructing sets of rules for detection can become obsolete very quickly.
But an underlying fact for any variant is its dependence on the sequence of commands it needs to
operate. While those commands can be spread out within the execution, they cannot be eliminated
or invariably reordered. The nature of their co-occurrence in sequence or in some patterns is still
essential for these variants to operate.
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Machine learning models can be trained to learn both the presence and sequential occurrence of
events leading to malicious actions. Neural networks for sequential learning like Long Short-Term
Memory or LSTM [18, 12] recurrent neural networks excel at tasks of learning sequences with a
fixed vocabulary. They have shown exemplary results over the past few years in primary sequential
learning domains like speech [14] and natural language modeling and translation [4, 31]. Besides
these, LSTMs have shown significant success in a much broader range of sequential problems as
well. Pointer Networks [33], Neural Turing Machines and Differentiable Neural Computers [16, 15],
have demonstrated the ability of LSTMs to be used for far more complex tasks when augmented with
attention [35] and memory [34].
AI-based learning models for malware detection, therefore, can be constructed with the help of LSTMs
when event sequences are available. Use of language models with Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
has been demonstrated by [25, 2] on malware detection tasks. The two primary objectives in such
problems are event presence detection and sequential occurrence binding. LSTMs, in particular, are
excellent operators for sequential occurrence, and hence lead to significantly improved results in
the process. Presence detection, while done efficiently by RNNs and LSTMs, is a specialty of the
Convolutional Neural Networks, or CNNs [23]. While extremely effective in computer vision [22, 28],
CNNs have also shown success on sequential learning problems [10, 11]. For the closely related
task of multi-class classification among malware families, the authors have shown in [21] the use of
CNNs as they capture essential elements across the event sequences.
In this paper, we present robust models for Neural Malware Detection that can operate directly on file
event sequences in order to learn a probability of the file being malicious in nature. These models
are probabilistic, robust and resilient against polymorphism observed in malicious files. We present
results from these deep models on a large dataset consisting of 634,249 sequences of variable length.
We believe that this is by far the largest study of malware behavioral models.
On performing structural evaluation of these models, we explored a vulnerability persistent even
in highly accurate models that can potentially limit their long term use if the attackers learn to
construct resilient malicious files. All of these models are limited by the length of the sequences they
can operate on, making them ineffective against malware hidden in extremely long sequences, or
malicious files that execute long running loops of legitimate commands before reaching the malicious
events. Potentially, the use of LSTMs allows these models to learn very long sequences, as the cells
can continue to retain context. In language modeling, this ability helps retain the necessary word
context. However in software event sequences, as observed in malware detection data, context can
be reset at several places along the sequence and a distant hidden event can be harder to correlate
with consecutive malicious events. Apart from that, capturing full length sequences also results in
extremely compute-intensive models that are harder to train and deploy.
In this paper, we present neural models that are immune to the length of the input sequence. We
implement a version of Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences (CPoLS) [30] which can capture
sequences of any variable length. This allows our model to detect malware where events are hidden
deep within the sequences. This model partitions the input sequence and distributes the learning
process by using CNNs within a recurrent learning setting. We present models for efficiently learning
complete event sequences with variable and extremely long lengths in order to detect malware hidden
deep within the sequences. The CPoLS approach captures the entire length of a sequence by splitting
it into chunks and distributes the learning process by using CNNs in a recurrent fashion. As shown
by Stokes et al. [30], such models retain the sequential nature of input entirely without any loss of
data. We also make our models resilient against evasion by capturing full length sequences without
losing any data within the sequence.
The paper presents a description of all of our models with an emphasis on removing any vulnerability
in order to create future resilient Neural Malware Detection systems. We start by discussing the
motivation behind this problem and the need for neural models. We then discuss the data. This is
followed by a detailed discussion of our models. Next we describe the experimental process and
results obtained on our data. We then present a small discussion on emerging challenges in malware
detection, as well as the potential use of our full-length models in other domains. This discussion is
followed by a review of related literature. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the benefits of
the proposed neural models, and the advantages of CPoLS inspired methodologies for performing
lossless learning on extremely long sequences.
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2 Motivation
Advances in the space of malware detection using artificial intelligence and machine learning have
significantly strengthened the success rates in detection. Moreover, the concept of using emulation
sequences for file commands provides us with a peek into internal operations of a malicious file,
allowing a learning model to understand its core. We observe that within these sequences, the
primary objective of learning malicious actions is finding the presence of potential events within
entire sequences, and detecting their sequential occurrence. This seemingly trivial learning task, in
reality, is much more challenging because of the nature of these underlying commands. Individually
all these commands refer to legitimate system operations and cannot be associated with a level of
badness. It is the ordered co-occurrence of several such commands which triggers critical action
within system processing to deviate from standard actions. Numerically, such models can still exhibit
a very low error rate, and achieve a high accuracy. However, due to the nature of such systems and
their underlying data, error rate alone is not a strong representation of a model. Due to their real
world impact, false positive rates in malware detection are also a critical metric of concern since
they can potential prevent a computer from starting or working correctly [6]. A slight miss in the
probability measurement from a malware detection model can turn into a huge cost for the underlying
system.
Therefore, it is critical for a good detection model to judge the event sequences at a much finer
granularity and still maintain a general enough weight association with events to prevent false
positives. In order to facilitate such learning, the training methodology must put into consideration
certain characteristics of the dataset according to the algorithms being used. We believe that neural
models are a good choice because of the sequential nature of the data and their ability to learn a fixed
vocabulary for the set of events observed in these sequences. An important aspect for a robust Neural
Malware Detection system is to exclude as many assumptions and limitations from the training data
as possible. We suggest using sequences with variation in lengths, with similar distribution over
event vocabulary in both label classes, and avoiding loss of information throughout the sequences in
order to regularize the dataset sufficiently. We also propose that the model should not be associated
with direct embeddings of these events throughout and must generate learned tensors in order to
escape hard binding of individual events with malware. It is often possible among training batches
to incur some bias and associate higher weights with certain events commonly found in sequences
leading to a similar label. In such cases, more significance might be learned towards particular events
rather than learning from entire sequences. A robust model should be able to maximize detection
among sequences, while ensuring generalization over the entire length of an individual sequence.
Such systems can then learn patterns and ordered co-occurrence of events causing malicious actions,
instead of directly learning event-based activations.
This criticality of the problem and requirement to retain learning within the respective general blocks
motivates our methods for malware detection. Our models leverage the language model-based
approach of LSTMs in order to join the event sequences, perform convolutions to derive significant
occurrences within extremely long sequences, and ensure end-to-end training in the attempt to learn
embeddings driven directly by the true label. In the next section we discuss our proposed models in
detail and introduce a chunked sequential learning approach that can help detection in the space of
very large sequences hiding critical information.
3 Data
The event sequences that we analyze in this paper are generated by a modified version of the Microsoft
production anti-malware engine which logs the system API calls made by a portable executable (PE)
file (e.g., .exe, .dll). All of the PE files in our dataset are written for the Microsoft Windows operating
system. To collect the data, we analyzed a large set of malicious and benign files by scanning them
with the anti-malware engine, and collecting the emulation logs corresponding to each file. During the
data collection, the malware did not have internet access to prevent the infection of other computers.
The logs were collected in August 2017, and thus represent recent malware families. The length
of the original sequences varies from file to file and is determined by heuristics employed by the
anti-malware engine based on the earlier behavior of the file.
Adversaries sometimes use polymorphism which uses different API calls to achieve the same goal.
For example to create a file, they may call ofstream.open in C++, fopen in C, or the Windows
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Table 1: Example of the first behavior events in a file
File Event
createfile
virtualalloc
virtualalloc
getmodulehandle
getmodulefilename
user mode CreateFile function. From kernel mode in Windows, they may call the ZwCreateFile or
NtCreateFile to create a file. To handle polymorphism, multiple API calls can be mapped to the same
high-level event, and the total number of high-level events in our data is 156. The first five events
in a sample file are shown in Table 1. In addition, each file is assigned a label l ∈ {0, 1} where 1
indicates that file is malware and a benign file has a label of 0.
The files were randomly selected from our incoming production streams of files to be analyzed and
included in this dataset were selected from a larger collection according to the following criteria. First,
we only included a single file instance for each distinct event sequence. Second we discarded any
file sequences which had multiple labels: we did not include any files with the same event sequence,
but were labeled as both malware and benign. Third, we discarded any files with less than 50 events.
The original dataset includes the results of emulating 634,249 files which is then randomly split into
separate training, validation, and test datasets including 443,974, 63,425, and 126,850, respectively.
Distribution over labels in this datasets corresponds to 75% malicious samples, and 25% benign
samples.
In order to use these sequences with our model, we first create a vocabulary of the 156 event IDs
and then translate the event sequences into our vocabulary space, while keeping a UNK entry for
any event outside the vocabulary. Each learning batch therefore consists of sequences over the 156
vocabulary space, resulting in a three dimensional tensor for the batch input. The input dimensions
specify the batch size, sequence length, and event embedding dimension, respectively.
4 Threat Model
The anti-malware engine and its algorithms are under constant attack by adversaries, and it is
important to list the assumptions we make about the attacker with respect to the proposed system.
We first assume that the computer has not been previously infected. Thus, the trusted computing
boundary includes the operating system, user account, and anti-malware detection system.
Our models analyze data collected from an emulator running in the anti-malware engine. In some
cases, malware tries to detect if it is being executed in an emulator, and if so, it halts any malicious
activity (i.e., cloaking). Thus, we assume that the malware does not use cloaking to avoid detection.
Since our data is collected in a lab without internet access, we assume that the malware does not
alter its behavior due a failure to communicate with its command and control infrastructure or other
web services. Before being put into production, the system would need to be trained and tested with
sequences that were obtained with internet access.
5 System Design
As discussed previously, our Neural Malware Detection models learn using the emulation event
sequences and are trained end-to-end fashion where the loss gradient flows directly from the final
label. Our objective with these sequences is to detect the presence of potential events and their
sequential correlation with other events causing the malicious action. These events can be both
grouped or scattered throughout the sequence. They are not necessarily consecutive, but are ordered
in most cases. Therefore, both presence and order play an important role in this detection. In this
section, we discuss our learning models in detail. We also comment on certain limitations of our
fixed-length models and present a model that can operate efficiently over sequences of any length.
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5.1 Building Blocks
We begin with a short review of the basic units forming our models. In particular, we use LSTM
recurrent neural networks to capture the sequential data. In our extension models, we also use CNNs
to extract significant event occurrences within the entire length of long sequences. Throughout the
models, we also use the concept of Max Pooling along one dimension. This property helps reduce
the dimensionality within the model at different steps and helps extract significant embeddings and
activation wherever required.
5.1.1 LSTM:
Long Short-Term Memory [18, 12] neural networks are a memory-based variant of Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs) where each neuron is defined to be a gated cell with memory. These networks are
less vulnerable to the vanishing gradient problem [17, 5] and operate by maintaining both a hidden
state and memory at each time step. This capability of LSTMs has made them popular in language
models and sequential architectures. Among the different variants of the algorithm that are commonly
used, we use the following equations for our implementation of the LSTM in this paper.
it = σ(Whi ∗ ht−1 +Wxi ∗ xt + bi)
ft = σ(Whf ∗ ht−1 +Wxf ∗ xt + bf )
ot = σ(Who ∗ ht−1 +Wxo ∗ xt + bo)
ct = ft  ct−1 + it  tanh(Whc ∗ ht−1 +Wxc ∗ xt + bc)
ht = ot  tanh(ct)
(1)
where σ is the logistic sigmoid function, it, ft,ot, ct are the input gate, forget gate, output gate and
cell activation respectively. Wh(·) are the recurrent weight matrices for each gate, Wx(·) are the
input weight matrices per gate, and b(·) are the biases for each gate. At each timestep t, the network
takes as input a vector xt and updates both the cell memory ct and provides a hidden state ht. Input
vector xt can be the representation of the input in any format such as one-hot encoding, or a dense
embedding. Function  represents the pairwise product between two vectors.
LSTMs are often used in deep models by stacking multiple layers on top of each other. Stacked-
LSTMs [13] allow deeper learning of the structures where each layer gets an embedding from a lower
layer while traversing across the timesteps of the sequence.
5.1.2 CNN:
Convolutional Neural Networks [23] are extremely powerful models often used in the space of
computer vision [22, 28]. Compared to LSTMs, CNNs are faster and more efficient architectures
which use smaller kernels that are trained at different locations within the input data. In images,
this refers to training smaller blocks within an entire image with the same set of weights instead of
using a larger weight tensor for the complete image size. Similarly for one-dimensional data like
sentences, CNNs traverse over smaller chunks of the input and perform convolutions across each
chunk while updating the smaller weight kernel. Recently, CNNs have shown success on sequential
learning problems [10, 11] and continue to be explored in this new space.
5.1.3 Max Pooling:
Pooling operations are often used in CNNs [29, 8] to reduce dimensionality and extract significant
features in deeper models. Max pooling can be used with one-dimensional sequences as well allowing
for the extraction of higher activations within a deep model. Hence, max pooling is capable of
deriving better embeddings for a higher objective than simply obtaining the activation of the final
timestep.
5.2 End-to-End Models
In order to learn the emulation sequences directly using a target label of malicious behavior, we
present our end-to-end models below. For each of these, given an input event sequence E of length T
5
timesteps consisting of events et at each time-step t in the sequence and a known label τ , we need to
predict the probability pm of sequence E being malware. In terms of the data under investigation,
these models are required to perform two crucial tasks. The first task is the detection of potential
events that can lead to a malicious action, and the second is the sequential linkage of events which
combine to represent a malicious action. Since these individual events are standard system commands,
the mere occurrence of an event within the sequence cannot be used to predict malware. Our initial
model designs are inspired by the language model and classifier-based malware detection presented
in [25, 2]
5.2.1 Direct Sequence Learning
The Direct Sequence Learning model (DSL) is our most basic end-to-end architecture. This model
relies on the capability of LSTMs to learn sequences and capture relevant information within the last
activation. This model uses LSTMs as the sequence learning mechanism, which helps convert an
entire sequence into an embedding by using only the last activation from the LSTM. This activation
is then passed through a regular dense layer for learning the derived representation. We produce the
final activation using a logistic sigmoid layer on top which provides the probability of input sequence
being malicious. Formally, the DSL model is defined as:
hL = LSTM(E)[T ]
hCL = RELU(WL ∗ hL)
pm = σ(WD ∗ hCL)
(2)
where hL is the hidden state activation from the LSTM at the last timestep T , and hCL is the
activation derived from a fully connected RELU neural network layer. pm is the final probability
of sequence E being malicious derived through a final logistic sigmoid layer σ. WL is the weight
matrix for the RELU layer and WD is the weight matrix for the final sigmoid layer for generating the
output probability.
5.2.2 LSTM and Max Pooling
While DSL is able to translate the sequence into a single vector embedding, it is optimized to predict
the last activation. Because of the nature of the vocabulary in our data, the structure of a sequence is
similar to a language model where the objective of the RNN is to predict the next word in the sequence.
Therefore, the last activation from the LSTM is best trained for predicting the representation of the
next event, and might not be of strong assistance in our objective of finding malicious event sequences.
In [2, 30], the authors have used an LSTM and Max Pooling for capturing events from the sequence.
Using a similar LSTM and Max Pooling (LAMP) concept in our models, we perform a temporal
max pooling over the resulting LSTM sequence. While in [2], the language model is independently
trained using a recurrent neural network, we tie the training of the LSTM with the complete model
similar to [30]. The LAMP model, therefore, first learns the representation for the input sequence
events, then performs a temporal max pooling operation on the sequential hidden states to create
a final sequence embedding, and then proceeds with dense layers to learn the output probability.
Formally, the LAMP implementation is defined as:
HL = LSTM(E)
hL = MAXPOOL1D(HL)
hCL = RELU(WL ∗ hL)
pm = σ(WD ∗ hCL)
(3)
where HL is the complete sequential output returned by the LSTM, and MAXPOOL1D is the
temporal max pooling layer that extracts the final embedding hL from HL.
5.2.3 Auxiliary-Output Language Learning
The Auxiliary-Output Language Learning model (AOLL) is a regularized extension of LAMP, built
to assist gradient flow in the complete model. Both LAMP and DSL train the LSTM layer directly
from the loss gradient using the final target label. We believe, that while this objective helps direct a
specific gradient flow throughout lower layers of the model, it can be assisted by an additional loss
in order to address the sequential nature of the data. Models presented in [25, 2] train a language
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model over the input sequences where the RNN, at each timestep, is trained to predict the next event
in the sequence. In order to incorporate such a goal within the end-to-end learning model, we use
two objectives in our AOLL model. We learn the probability pm in the same way as presented in
LAMP. In addition to this, the AOLL model also obtains an auxiliary output from the LSTM layer
in the form of its final activation. We use this output to predict the next event within the sequence,
leveraging the sequential learning nature of LSTMs. The complete model is now trained with two
objectives, and two loss functions, each of which generates a gradient flow within the model that is
used to update the weights. Formally, AOLL is defined as:
HL = LSTM(E)
hL = MAXPOOL1D(HL)
hCL = RELU(WL ∗ hL)
κL[t] = softmax(Wκ ∗HL[t]) ∀t ∈ [0, T − 1]
pm = σ(WD ∗ hCL)
(4)
where κL is a softmax output for each timestep of the sequence providing the probability over the
entire vocabulary V . At each timestep t, κL[t] is defined as a vector of size V representing an output
probability distribution for each possible event. This measure is aligned with the objective of the
language model to predict the next word (event) in the input sequence.
As mentioned above, the AOLL model uses two objective functions and therefore requires two loss
functions. For the three models (DSL, LAMP, and AOLL) defined above, we use Log Loss as our
loss function. For determining the probability pm, we use a loss in the form of binary cross-entropy.
For the stepwise outputs κL in AOLL, we use categorical cross-entropy as the loss function when
predicting the next event in the sequence. Formally, for all three models, with prediction pm and
known target label τ , we measure the final loss L as
L = LOGLOSS(pm, τ). (5)
For AOLL, with predictions κL and events et in the event sequence E for timestep t, we measure an
auxiliary loss Laux as
Laux = LOGLOSS(κL[t], et+1) ∀t ∈ [0, T − 1]. (6)
5.3 Model Limitations
The models defined above are all trained end-to-end using a known target label and input event
sequences only. A significant strength of these models is their ability to learn the sequence embeddings
that are critical informants of the malicious behavior in the sequence caused by the consecutive or
sequential occurrence of certain events. While the use of the LSTM provides us with the ability to
use variable length sequences, it often becomes computationally very expensive to train as the lengths
of the sequences increase. In general sequence learning, it is often common to cut the sequences
up to a certain prescribed length and then use those fixed length subsequences for training. In non
end-to-end models, it is possible to train the sequences on a certain sequence length and then use a
different length for further representation when used with deeper models. However these solutions
are still limited by the computation and memory capacities.
In language model based applications, capturing a limited length of the input sequence can often yield
a sufficient representation of the complete sequence. However in the case of detection within a longer
sequence, our objective is to find all the events that can lead to a malicious action, and they can be
separated to reach very long distances within the entire sequence. For instance, consider a malicious
event that requires events va, vb, and vc ∈ V to happen sequentially but does not need them to occur
consecutively. This event sequence, therefore, can incorporate a large number of random events vr1
. . . vrn between va and vb, and vb and vc respectively. An optimal system needs to detect the presence
of these events and generate an appropriate activation on detecting their sequential occurrence. If
the number of random events n increases drastically, the model can lose context of presence of va
by the time it reaches vb. One approach to retain distant event occurrences is by using Bidirectional
LSTMs [13], but in very long sequences this becomes even more computationally expensive for the
end-to-end model to train.
Another problem with limited length sequences in this case is that malware can often be written as
a long series of legitimate benign events followed by malicious events much later in the sequence
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Algorithm 1 CONVOLUTED PARTITIONING OF LONG SEQUENCES
Input: Sequence E, Chunk Size s
C = CHUNKIFY(E, s)
HRC = RECURRENTCONVOLUTIONS(C)
E′ = [hRC1, hRC2, hRC3 . . .]
pm = LAMP(E′)
return pm
(i.e., file). Limiting the length of such sequences provides potentially benign sequences to the system
with a malicious label. Therefore, for training on limited length, we need to filter data for prevention
against such cases, leading to loss of data. When given a very large dataset with malicious events
occurring within the smaller length sequences, a model can be trained well. However, limiting the
length of sequences adds a vulnerability to the model for the detection of malware. It is therefore
essential for a model to capture the entire length of the sequences in order to find the events located
at larger distances and still maintain their sequential order.
5.4 Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences
In order to capture both the presence of events, and their sequential relationship in very long sequences,
we use the Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences (CPoLS) approach introduced in [30] for
detecting malicious JavaScript and VBScript. A similar approach is presented in [27] where the
authors performed a static analysis on the chunked PE file byte sequence. These models were not
effective in either case. The implementation adopted in [27] uses the last hidden output from the
LSTM. However based on our experimental results with RNNs and LSTMs, temporal max pooling
often performs significantly better than using the last hidden state when performing event detection
within a sequence. We believe that this model approach applies well to our problem of malware
detection since the length of event sequences can be extremely long. While the authors in [30] have
demonstrated the use of CPoLS on shorter byte sequences of length 1000, we extend this model to
any length and do not use any limiting factors in our models. In our CPoLS models, we are able to
learn end-to-end models from the entire length of very long sequences and capture the sequential
nature of events. We formalize the CPoLS model in Algorithm 1.
For an input event sequence E, we first split it into a chunked sequence C = [c1, c2, c3, . . .], where
E = c1|c2|c3| . . ., using Algorithm 2. Since E itself is a sequence, subsequences ci ∈ C are ordered
in nature. This operation increases the dimensionality of the batch input tensor from 3 to 4 dimensions.
We now treat each chunk as an element of our top-level sequence which is passed through a recurrent
or a time distributed layer that sequentially processes each chunk. Within each of these recurrent
processes, we perform convolutional learning on the subsequence within that timestep as shown in
Algorithm 3. By performing convolutions, our goal is to extract significant event presence from each
subsequence and reduce the overall dimensionality of the problem. Therefore, each chunk ci, in the
recurrent processing, is passed through a 1-dimensional convolutional neural network (CONV1D),
and then through a time distributed max pooling layer (MAXPOOL1D). This allows us to reduce the
size of each chunk, and of the entire sequence. We recombine the outputs of each chunk to form
a new sequence representing activations from recurrent convolutions. We then pass this derived
sequence through the LSTM of our end-to-end models. Due to the usage of the derived sequences,
we cannot use the AOLL model with CPoLS.
Algorithm 2 CHUNKIFY
Input: Sequence E, Chunk Size s
Initialize chunks = [ ].
for i = 0 to len(E)/s do
APPEND(E[s ∗ i : (s+ 1) ∗ i], chunks)
end for
return chunks
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Algorithm 3 RECURRENTCONVOLUTIONS
Input: Chunks C
for ck in C do
hCk = CONV1D(ck)
hMPk = MAXPOOL1D(hCk)
end for
HMP = [hMP1, hMP2, hMP3, . . .]
return HMP
6 Experiments and Results
We performed an extensive evaluation of the models presented above with our emulation sequence
dataset. We implemented these models on the Tensorflow [1] platform using the Keras [7] library.
Both models and data access operations were written using the Python programming language. Our
models were trained on 2 Nvidia Tesla K40m GPUs.
For each model, we ran several iterations to identify the best hyper-parameter settings. We used
LSTM as our recurrent neural network module in each model. The hidden dimension of 1500 was
used for the LSTM in each model. For our vocabulary of size 156, we used an embedding dimension
of size 114 throughout the models. The RELU layer used in our models had a hidden dimension of
64. The CNN layer used in the CPoLS model performed one-dimensional convolutions on a window
of 10 items, with a stride size of 5. The CNNs used a channel size of 114, which is equal to the
embedding dimension, in order to consider each dimension within the computation. Each model was
run for 15 epochs on 443,974 training samples, and validated on 63,425 samples after each epoch.
For the limited length models, we used sequences of length 256. We used the ADAM optimizer [19]
with a learning rate of 0.001. For the limited length models we used a mini-batch size of 64. For full
length models, we used a mini-batch size of 32. The results presented in this section use 126,850
test samples on our trained models. For each model, we present the average results over multiple
iterations using the best settings.
We present results across three significant metrics. We first discuss the average result accuracies
derived by our models in predicting the probability pm of a file being malicious. Accuracies provide
us with an overall strength of the Neural Malware Detection systems in detecting malicious action
within a sequence. As we discussed earlier, this problem is more critical and sensitive to false
positives due to the nature of the underlying systems. Therefore, we also compare our models
using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) plots, in order to get a finer sense of each model’s
performance. Along with the ROC plot, we also measure the True Positive Rate (TPR) at fine scale
in order to learn the performance of our system. We measure the TPR, therefore at a False Positive
Rate (FPR) of 1%. Table 2 summarizes the accuracies and TPRs across models and configurations.
Figure 1 presents the ROC plots for the best performing version of each model. We have limited the
x-axis scale on the ROC plots to a finer scale of 2% on the FPR. By visualizing at an FPR of 2%,
we evaluate each model’s performance at a much finer scale than possible through accuracies. Even
with minor variation in accuracies, it can be observed that the CPoLS model operating on full length
sequences performs much better at a very low FPR as well, maximizing the effective area under the
curve.
As can be seen, CPoLS not only builds resilience against long sequences, but also performs sig-
nificantly better than the other models on our dataset. These neural models respond aptly to the
criticality of our problem. The model which combines a CNN followed by an LSTM proposed by
Kolosnjaji, et al. [21] performed better than DSL in terms of average accuracy, but had a significantly
lower performance in TPR@1% and the best case ROC curve. Our experiments with AOLL display
comparable performance to LAMP [25, 2], highlighting the ability of end-to-end models to identify
optimal gradient flow even when using multiple loss functions, but also signifying the effectiveness
of a single loss function optimizing the entire model end-to-end. These results also confirm the
ability to train models with supervised (classification) and unsupervised (language learning) methods
simultaneously in an end-to-end setting.
In our experiments with full length models, we also tested different chunk sizes and observed that
the selection of chunk size did not significantly affect the results, but did increase training speeds.
9
Table 2: Test accuracies (%) and TPRs (%) at an FPR = 1% for all the models
MODEL NAME ACCURACY TPR@1%
DSL nLSTM=1 0.881 68.44
Kolosnjaji et al. 0.932 59.96
AoLL nLSTM=1 0.922 68.14
AoLL nLSTM=2 0.932 67.40
LaMP nLSTM=1 0.947 76.50
LaMP nLSTM=2 0.951 76.27
CPoLS nLSTM=1 0.956 83.50
We experimented with different sizes between 32 and 256, but could not obtain significant accuracy
variation. This might be due to the fact that each of these chunk sizes were sufficient to capture
important event occurrence and can be subject to further evaluation in the future. The speed of training,
however, improved with larger chunks going under convolutions, hence lowering the sequence lengths
for the LSTMs at the following stages.
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Figure 1: Receiver operating characteristic plots for the models described above
7 Discussion
It is important to consider evasion when considering machine learning models for security applications.
Papernot, et al. [24] recently proposed an adversarial attack for recurrent neural networks. Recurrent
models are more challenging to attack than deep neural networks due their recurrent nature. To attack
a recurrent structure, the authors first unfold (i.e., unroll) the recurrent model into essentially a deep
neural network with many layers. Next they compute the unfolded Jacobian and perturbations to craft
adversarial sequences which can be used to trick the RNN into predicting the incorrect class.
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To the best of our knowledge, no adversarial defenses have been proposed for recurrent neural
networks. Thus, defenses against adversarial attacks directed at recurrent models, such as those
proposed in this paper, are an open research topic.
Besides malware detection, the models presented in this paper also provide potential approaches for
handling extremely large sequences in general. Neural network based models are applied to a large
number of applications across several domains. Depending on the nature of the respective data, the
length of sequences in these domains can play a significant role in the model’s learning capability.
While we presented our models for malware detection, our architecture, in particular is not tied to the
underlying problem and can be generalized for a broader set of problems. Learning on sequences
involving event detection, event prediction or any related objective can benefit from our models
in efficiently using the entire length of the sequences. We believe, with certain domain-specific
modifications, and with more generalization within the overall architecture, our models can help
perform lossless sequential learning irrespective of data lengths.
8 Related Work
The persistent increase in the growth and distribution of malware has called for the alarming need of
detection and prevention. Anti-virus and anti-malware systems developed over time have performed
in-depth analysis of malicious software families, have developed signatures, tagging methods and
several other mechanisms to tackle this ever growing problem. Exploration of using machine learning
in this space has witnessed the use of both traditional and deep learning models. Support Vector
Machines (SVM) have been incorporated into this task by [26]. Hidden Markov Models have been
explored by [3]. Assistance in signature generation using deep learning has been demonstrated
in [9] where they used Deep Belief Networks to generate malware signatures that could then be
passed through classification models. Entering more into the space of neural network-based models,
language structure within emulated sequences of a malicious executable have been utilized by [25, 2].
They have built RNN-based language models to learn the relationship between the event structure
and malware.
The CPoLS model used in this paper is based on [30] and uses CNNs over sequential structures.
While popularly used in image and graphical data, CNNs have also been used by [10], [11], where
they have shown exceptional results in the space of language models by constructing Sequence-to-
Sequence models using CNNs. In malware classification, [20] and [21] also demonstrated the use of
CNNs along with sequential learning. In their models for malware classification, they demonstrated
the ability to classify among malicious families from a dataset of malicious files. Among other
applications, an interesting mix of RNN and CNNs has been presented by [32] by first using RNNs
for feature extraction and generating image representations from files which are classified further by
CNNs.
9 Conclusions
Neural Malware Detection models, as presented in this paper, help combat the challenge of detecting
malware from extremely long API call sequences generated through an Anti-malware engine. While
helping to resolve a major concern in computer security, our models also address the critical and
sensitive nature of this problem.
Through this paper, we presented several end-to-end models that use combinations of LSTM recurrent
neural networks and CNNs. Our models learn entirely from event sequences while learning event
embeddings within the deep models themselves. Through our full-length based models, we present
efficient methods to perform lossless sequence learning on extremely long sequences in detection
tasks. Through our training and results on the largest malware dataset of 634,249 sequences, we
demonstrated the significance of using entire sequence lengths when performing malware detection.
In our AOLL model, we have also demonstrated the use of multiple objectives and losses within
an end-to-end setting that utilize additional gradient flows within the model while maximizing the
primary objective of predicting the probability of maliciousness. Through CPoLS, we demonstrated
the advantages of using Convolutional Neural Networks for event detection in association with
LSTMs for sequential binding. Through our CHUNKIFY approach, we presented an effective method
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for the break down of extremely long sequences in learning tasks without losing the sequential nature
at any stage of the model.
In summary, this paper targets the core of the malware operation style and learns from it a Neural
Malware Detection model, which can be used directly with emulators, can be embedded within
anti-malware systems to serve as a detection operator, can efficiently handle long sequences, and is
resilient to variations and loops emerging in malware over time.
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